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ABSTRACT
The undergraduate thesis began with the research question of whether the
Islamic community is being profiled by the use of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. At the beginning of
the project, the researcher’s hypothesis was that Muslim community had fallen victim to
profiling through the use of electronic surveillance conducted by the American
government. The research presented reveals a pattern of profiling and injustices
against many different groups of Americans throughout the history of United States
surveillance laws starting with the illegal alcohol producers in the 1920’s. Amendments
to FISA have set necessary modern electronic surveillance regulations back 30 years.
The researcher brings to light the injustices the Islamic community has endured out of
the panic caused by the attacks on 9/11.
The research presented was achieved by using empirical legal studies
techniques of incorporating a mix-methods approach to utilize both quantitative and
qualitative research components. The researcher developed a spreadsheet that
included all published federal opinions of prosecutions involving FISA since its
enactment in 1978. Statistical data was analyzed using frequency and average
software, known as Stata, and the results of study suggest an extreme increase in the
amount of prosecutions involving the Islamic community since 9/11 compared to prior.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
As soon as man had the ability to communicate beyond face-to-face interaction,
the government aggressively pursued interception of those communications. The
accessibility of electronic communications allows for anyone with basic computer skills,
including the government, to gain access to that information. The government has an
interest in protecting its citizens from foreign and domestic threats, and federal
authorities monitor electronic communications and conduct surveillance on individuals
and groups to detect and interpret potential threats. Most notably, the federal
government has demonstrated a pattern of eavesdropping on the communications of
religious groups, members of racial and political movements and other organizations
who are believed to pose threats. With modern technology moving at an unseen rate in
the recent decade, the researcher must ask if the laws protecting a citizen’s right to
privacy are keeping up.
The risk of infringement of a person’s right to privacy has also increased due to
the panic caused by modern terrorist acts. The attacks on 9/11 came as a nationwide
shock to most in the country who thought America was protected by thousands of miles
and an ocean between the United States and the radicals committing terrorist acts.
Without question, if an individual or group attacks or threatens the well being of United
States’ citizens then there is a duty for officials to investigate the alleged attackers and
their associates. There are indications, however, the federal government is conducting
surveillance far beyond what is necessary to find the wrongdoers and prevent further
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atrocities against the American people.1 The important question is whether the
government’s impinging on citizens’ rights is justified in order for authorities to fulfill their
obligations to prevent threats against the Country and to keep Americans safe. To
further examine the dilemma, the researcher references an old theory “it is better to let a
truly guilty man walk then an innocent man be convicted.” This theory contains far
heavier consequences in the realm of threats against the American people, but its
meaning is still clear. The research indicates the government is impeding on
Americans’ rights and privacies without proper and just cause. The focus of study will
be the American Islamic community and what, if any, rights the community enjoys are
being violated by the national security efforts of the United States.
The government seemed just as unprepared as its people following one of the
nation’s darkest days, September 11, 2001. The country’s leaders endured a
tremendous amount of criticism and pressure about how the attacks should have or
could have been prevented. The study’s focus is not on how the attacks could have
been prevented, but on how changes to surveillance laws altered the way law
enforcement and national security officials conduct surveillance. Specifically, the study
is concerned with what impact the changes in surveillance have on Americans’
constitutional rights.
The actions taken following 9/11 diminished many previously fought for
standards of what it takes to gain full and uncontrolled access to Americans’ private
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See generally Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of Religious
Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1201 (2004).
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information. Before the attacks on 9/11, regulation of the government’s surveillance on
potential foreign threats and their domestic accomplices came from the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).2 FISA was enacted in 1978 and its original
purpose was to end an era of out-of-control surveillance conducted by the National
Security Agency (NSA).3 FISA established regulations governing who could be targeted
and measures for warranted surveillance on individuals with an alleged national security
interest. Most notably, FISA established that only individuals thought to be agents of
foreign powers could be subjected to this kind of surveillance.4
FISA was a little used and little known piece of legislation before 9/11, but soon it
became the tool the government would employ to carry out new surveillance standards
to “better protect” its citizens from past, present, and future threats. FISA and its
standards first began their evolution quickly after 9/11 under the USA PATRIOT Act and
many changes since. These changes will be discussed in greater detail, but overall
weakened the standards for approval of surveillance. At the same time, the ones
investigating and conducting the surveillance gained an unprecedented amount of
freedom in the approval process.
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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885c (2008).

3

Jonathan D. Forgang, Note, “The Right of the people”: The NSA, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008,
and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance of Americans Overseas, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 217, 223 (2009).
4

Id.
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The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) is the body of power in the
approval process for FISA orders.5 Amendments to FISA have reduced the FISC’s
authority to fully review a FISA order. The reduction on what it takes to get permission
to obtain surveillance orders today is far less than what FISA originally required. FISA’s
purpose as enacted was to prevent unjust surveillance on American citizens without
proper standards for suspicion being met.
The government’s use of surveillance is not a new phenomenon nor is the
government’s monitoring of a variety of assemblies of American citizens. The
government has infiltrated and conducted electronic surveillance on groups of
Americans throughout modern history, always justifying the intrusions as an attempt to
prevent further aggression. Beginning with alleged bootleggers during prohibition at the
turn of the 20th century, to the government’s profiling and detaining of Japanese
Americans during the Second World War, to today’s alleged monitoring of Muslim
Americans following September 11, 2001, the government has consistently engaged in
a practice of invading Americans’ privacy.
Throughout history, the United States has shown a pattern in acting before
thinking in a time of panic after crisis. Following such gross conduct the government
has demonstrated remorse by apologizing and then strengthening standards for
domestic surveillance to prevent the possibility of reoccurrence. The enactment of FISA
was one of the steps taken to make sure only the most significant threats would be the
basis for approval for electronic surveillance. However, the government has a proven
5

Richard H. Seamon, Domestic Surveillance for International Terrorists: Presidential Power and Fourth
Amendment Limits, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 449, 460 (2008).
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history of repeating its mistakes and disregarding lessons learned. The amendments to
FISA have set back the standards for electronic surveillance thirty years and the
mistakes corrected previously are free to occur again.
The primary focus of this research is to examine governmental eavesdropping
on one particular group of Americans, Muslims and Islamic groups inside the United
States. The researcher will demonstrate that Muslim Americans are being profiled by
the use of surveillance through FISA and the evidence or intelligence obtained.
Protecting America from harm is necessary to ensure safety from both internal and
external threats, but at the same time the government’s intrusions should be limited to
absolute necessity. Just as warrants for surveillance and search and seizures for
common crimes have extremely high standards, so should they be in place for issues
related to national security. FISA orders allow for officials to gain full access to an
organization’s or person’s finances, history, and personal affairs. Without due process
being given to those under investigation by the government, much that our country
stands for is lost. This country is built on the protection of its citizen’s rights against
government intrusion. Even though the severity and consequences of the matters
relating to FISA and national security may be higher than others, the government should
not take action without proper cause. The government argues that FISA matters are
extremely time sensitive and original FISA language hinders their ability to prevent
terrorism. The researcher does not argue that some threats are time sensitive and
require quick action, but the amendments to FISA have been enacted in a way to treat
all security interests in this way. The study will show the government has not in all
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instances acted in good faith in regards to federal prosecutions in which FISA was used.
It is this that causes the researcher to question the standards and application of FISA.
The researcher will demonstrate in some cases that the government is
persecuting individuals and groups in a way that goes far beyond finding true justice.
Doing so, the examiner will use case law of federal prosecutions where FISA is used as
evidence and a tool for the collection of intelligence information. The research provides
an example of a case in which the United States continued prosecution even after
others had been successfully convicted of the crime. This raises a legitimate concern of
why the government is unwilling to accept its own mistakes unless there is another
reason for prosecution. The researcher shows the controllers of surveillance may have
hidden agendas in the acquisition of individuals for investigation and the prosecutions
for them.
FISA is a key weapon in the government’s arsenal for monitoring terrorists and
terror cells both inside the United States and abroad. A criticism of FISA is that the
statutory standards for acquiring court orders to conduct secret surveillance of targets
are less rigorous than those required by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 (Title III)(ECPA), for non-terrorist warrants and other ordinary law enforcement
investigative surveillance techniques. The disconcerting part about the way the
Department of Justice (DOJ) employs FISA is if the rules and regulations of FISA are
minimally satisfied, then there is ample room for mistakes to occur. This could allow the
possibility for an innocent individual’s reputation to be tarnished permanently.

6

After 9/11, Congress amended FISA and changed its original purpose to provide
a statutory scheme for gathering intelligence by the nation’s Executive Branch. 6 The
change resulted from the terror attacks and, initially, Executive Branch authorities
conducted research to identify potential terror threats. The attacks of 9/11 have
impacted the way the government conducts surveillance at every turn. The pressure
from the American people to find the wrongdoers from that day and prevent further
aggressions against the country resulted in quick action by the government and has
lead to many mistakes in the years following. The escalation of conflict between the
United States and the Islamic based terrorist network has further persisted in the
suspension of many Muslims living in the United States.
Although there are sufficient instances in which Muslim Americans and Islamic
groups are being persecuted by the government, a large cross section of non-Islamic
citizens have as well been impacted. FISA surveillance can just as easily be used to
investigate individuals conducting business with suspected national security threats.
The individuals working with these groups may not truly know who they are dealing with.
Even so, the unknowing individual’s financial records and personal information can
become part of a government investigation with a FISA order. The researcher will
further demonstrate later that, in more than one circumstance, the government has
construed information on non-terror suspects to further its investigation. Another logical
concern is the security of information not pertinent to the investigation the government
poses and the safety and security of those contents. This research supports findings of
6

Id. at 238.
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governmental misuse by the use of FISA and the sanctity of those documents is as well
in question.
To some, stripping the rights of certain individuals to prevent further attacks from
occurring may be acceptable after the attacks on 9/11; however it has been over nine
years since those attacks. Originally, leaders predicted further aggressions from the
radical Muslim community on U.S. soil, but none have occurred. An assumption may be
that because of the government’s aggressive surveillance they prevented additional
terrorist attacks, but what if there were never any others that would have occurred?
That would mean that many Americans’ privacy rights were diminished and all of their
personal information obtained for no good reason.
This research will prove the government has gone far beyond what is necessary
to gain order and control in the modern era as far as terrorism is concerned. It will also
demonstrate that the actions taken to diminish the standards and regulations of FISA
have and continue to leave ample room for mistake and irreparable damage to many
citizens’ reputations in the United States. The profiling of the Islamic community by the
use of FISA surveillance and evidence is a very real and continuing problem and,
unless proper legislation is made to prevent it from continuing to occur, only more
Americans will fall victim to improper intrusions by the government. Questioning the
government’s use of FISA is necessary to ensure the rights of American citizens.

8

Chapter 2. Literature Review
According to research, the United States government has demonstrated a
heightened interest in monitoring racial groups or religious organizations following any
large scale incident that threatens the country.7 The interest has been sufficiently
intensive to raise concerns of a governmental pattern of prejudice to these individuals.8
The most recent major threatening event occurred on American soil on September 11,
2001 by Jihadist terrorists.9 Although the terrorists represented an extremist sect of the
Islamic faith, the result is that the primary target of government surveillance today is
anyone who is thought to be assisting or harboring Islamic or modern style terrorists. 10
The history of the United States government’s electronic surveillance of its
citizens has deep roots that begin with prohibition and bootleggers. 11 The government
without warrants began a practice of intercepting telephone conversations of suspected
producers of untaxed and illegal alcohol.12 The first Supreme Court decision on
wiretaps resulted from these early intrusions.13 In Olmstead v. United States, the
7

Lininger, supra note 1 at 1210-27.
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See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, 22 Annual Edward v. Sparer Symposium: Terrorism and the
Constitution: Civil Liberties in a New America: Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the
Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004).
9

Id. at 1003.
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Lininger, supra note 1 at 1212-15.

11

Neal Katyal & Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality of the NSA Surveillance
Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1035 (2008).
12

Brenton Hund, Disappearing Safeguards: FISA Nonresident Alien “Loophole” is Unconstitutional, 15
CARDOZA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 169, 177 (2007).
13

Id.
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Supreme Court examined if the interception of Roy Olmstead’s personal phone calls
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.14 The Court held that because the wiretaps were
not a physical trespass, that a citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights to search and seizure
could not be violated.15 In reaction to the Olmstead decision, the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 was passed by Congress to impose the first domestic
wiretap regulations.16 The restrictions protected citizens Fourth Amendment rights for
telephone interception, but because it was limited to domestic wiretapping, it did nothing
to regulate surveillance for national security matters.17
In the 1940’s, tensions about whether the United States would become part of
World War II were finally answered following the attacks on December 7, 1941.18 Pearl
Harbor was a surprise attack assisted and coordinated by Japanese loyalists on the
ground living in Hawaii.19 The thought of the enemy living next door and aiding the
motherland in further aggressions against the United States led to one of the largest
examples of racial profiling in the country’s history. 20 Courts quickly passed curfews

14

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).

15

Hund, supra note 13 at 177.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Eric L. Muller, Loyalty and Criminal Justice: A Mini-Symposium: The Japanese American Cases- A
Bigger Disaster Than We Realized, 49 HOW . L.J. 417, 421 (2006).
19

Id.

20

Patrick O. Gudridge, Judgments Judged and Wrongs Remembered: Examining the Japanese American
Civil Liberties Cases on their Sixtieth Anniversary: The Constitution Glimpsed from Tule Lake, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 81, 83 (2005).
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and restrictions on Japanese Americans living in the United States, but the anxiety of
further attacks assisted by Japanese living within the borders fueled a campaign that
would lead to the destruction of the human rights of Japanese Americans.21 In early
1942, Japanese Americans were forcibly relocated to camps in the western United
States to reduce the potential for further aggression against Americans.22 The
government relocated an in excess of 100,000 Japanese American residents to camps
with poor conditions and few amenities.23 The United States perceived these Japanese
Americans to be potential spies, much like the ones used by Japan in the attack on
Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.24 Although the war relocation camps were not death camps, the
extreme conditions and poor amenities resulted in death to many detainees.25
In the 1950’s and 1960’s, a new target emerged as fear of communism mounted.
Justified by concerns that the United States could be unknowingly harboring communist
spies, Truman justified his use of wiretapping and secret surveillance to peer into the
lives of Americans.26 This fear became known as the “Red Scare.”27 The Red Scare is

21

Id.

22

Garrick B. Pursley, Note: Thinking Diversity, Rethinking Race: Toward a Transformative Concept of
Diversity in Higher Education, 82 TEX. L. REV. 153, 162 (2003).
23

Robert F. Turner, Torture, Enhanced Interrogation, and the War on Terror, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 529,
536 (2010).
24

Pursley, supra note 23, at 162.

25

Turner, supra note 24, at 536.

26

William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U.L.
REV. 1, 26-28 (2000).
27

Laura K. Donohue, Criminal Law: Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1073 (2006).
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a dark period in the country’s history, and a time when Americans accused others and
family members of being spies.28 To root out those who could be potential threats,
Truman created the National Security Agency (NSA).29 The NSA’s authority to
eavesdrop created many problems because there were few laws regulating how the
NSA obtained permission to invade a citizen’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy.30
The controversy surrounding the red scare led to many changes in, but not the
disbanding of the NSA it is still around today.
After 9/11, the NSA began data mining telephone conversations and records of
millions of Americans in an effort to weed out further persons living in the United States
who might be aiding foreign powers.31 The federal authorities required the assistance of
the nation’s telecommunications companies, and made thousands if not hundreds of
thousands of requests for subscriber information.32 Great controversy surrounded the
requests, but because of the secrecy of the government’s actions, the requests did not
become public for some time.33 Even today, it is not known publicly which companies
complied with the government’s requests and which refused.34 Eventually, some

28

Id.

29

See generally Francesca Bignami, European versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis
of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609 (2007).
30

Michael A. Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip and the Constitution,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 714 (1995).
31

Bignami, supra note 30, at 613.

32

Id. at 614.

33

Id.
Id.

34
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companies challenged the government’s secret data mining requests through legal
action in federal court.35 When asked to determine whether the NSA did have the
authority to require the release of private information, the courts ruled that they did.36
Governmental surveillance continued throughout the sixties and early seventies,
but this time with a new target, African American civil rights groups.37 J. Edgar Hoover,
became very interested in these civil rights groups and in particular the conversations
and actions of Martin Luther King (MLK).38 The government claimed its surveillance on
MLK and other civil rights groups was necessary because of the suspicion that the
communist party had infiltrated them.39 Some, including Hoover, thought the alleged
communists that had infiltrated these groups would try to attempt to use the momentum
of the civil rights movement to further a communist agenda.40
During the civil rights movement, the government actually recorded African
American religious sermons and monitored the homes of civil rights leaders, including
MLK.41 At one point in the MLK investigation, the government had fifteen different
recording microphones to tape his sermons and personal conversations within his own

35

Id. at 615.

36

Id.

37

See generally Tara M. Sugiyama & Marisa Perry, Note: The NSA Domestic Surveillance Program: An
Analysis of Congressional Oversight during an Era of One-Party Rule, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 149
(2006).
38

Lininger, supra note 1, at 1209.

39

Id. at 1211.

40

Id.
Id. at 1208.

41
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home.42 In addition, the government tried a number of times with at least one success
to infiltrate MLK’s inner circle.43 Hoover wanted to infiltrate MLK’s inner circle because
of a paranoia he had that MLK had an agenda far greater than that of equality in
America.44 He was once quoted saying “they had to dig deep in the garbage to come
up with this one” when MLK was awarded “Man of the Year” by Time Magazine. 45 It
was no secret to the public that the administration did not enjoy the efforts of the civil
rights movement or MLK and this provides an example of the government using its
power to conduct surveillance beyond the pursuit of national security.
After Hoover’s era, United States Attorney General Edward Levi implemented
stricter guidelines for government surveillance of religious groups to prevent excessive
and unwarranted tactics the government employed during the civil rights movement. 46
These guidelines became known as the “Levi Guidelines.”47 Effective until 2002, the
Levi Guidelines were then reduced by Attorney General John Ashcroft as a result of the
attacks by radical Muslims on 9/11.48
In the eighties, electronic surveillance slowed due to stricter regulations and little
foreign conflict. In the nineties, however, after the Oklahoma City bombing, radical
42

Id.

43

Id. at 1209.

44

Id. at 1208

45

Id.

46

Id. at 1211.

47

Id.

48

Id. at 1212.
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Christian groups became the main targets of surveillance techniques. 49 The United
States government became very weary of what these home-grown radical groups could
be planning, particularly given the fears surrounding the potential computer collapse at
the turn of the millennium.50 The bombings of abortion clinics in the nineties led to
further suspicions and surveillance of radical Christian groups.51 The numerous terrorist
attacks gave rise to surveillance throughout the era in an attempt to circumvent future
assaults from these domestic terrorist cells.52 A significant number of Americans
became targets of electronic surveillance and physical searches because of their
religious affiliation due to the attacks of just a few radicals.53
Two decades earlier, Congress recognized that surveillance of Americans by the
Executive Branch seemed to be getting out of hand. To investigate alleged abuses of
authority by the Executive Branch concerning its warrantless monitoring of American
citizens, Congress formed the Church Committee named for Congressman Frank
Church.54 The Church Committee published a report in 1976 outlining forty years of
domestic warrantless surveillance by United States presidents.55 The committee’s

49

Id. at 1226.

50

Id. at 1227.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

William C. Banks, 9/11 Five Years on: A look at the Global Response to Terrorism: The Death of FISA,
91 MINN. L. REV. 1209, 1225 (2007).
55

Id.
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findings concluded that "too many people have been spied upon by too many
Government agencies and .... Government has often undertaken the secret surveillance
of citizens on the basis of their political beliefs, even when those beliefs posed no threat
of violence or illegal acts on behalf of a hostile foreign power."56 The report at its heart
stressed the need to separate foreign and domestic surveillance threats.57 In 1978, due
to the unregulated NSA conduct, the Watergate scandal and the Church Committee
reports, Congress passed FISA as a measure to provide guidance and create
restrictions for surveillance of United States citizens residing here or in other
countries.58 As enacted, FISA is specifically designed to limit the presidential and
Executive Branch’s authority to conduct surveillance of American citizens.59
The FISC was established as an authority to review Department of Justice (DOJ)
requests for surveillance under the FISA umbrella.60 The FISC’s authority prevented
the government from widely going unchecked and conducting unethical surveillance.61
The FISC’s creation was to prevent conduct like the NSA surveillance in the sixties and
seventies. However, much of the FISC’s authority has been reduced following 9/11 and

56

Id. at 1226.

57

Id.

58

Donohue, supra note 28, at 1090.

59

Elizabeth Johnson, Note: Surveillance and Privacy under the Obama Administration: The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 and the Attorney General's Guidelines for
Domestic FBI Operations, 5 ISJLP 419, 435-37 (2010).
60

Seamon, supra note 5, at 460.

61

Forgang, supra note 3, at 235.
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past mistakes that made the court originally necessary are occurring once again.62
Prior to 2008 amendments, FISA orders had to state the surveillance or search criteria,
and the requests must show there is probable cause in order for the FISC to give
approval.63 The requests today only require the FISC to give a general procedural
ruling and the FISC no longer determines Fourth Amendment level probable cause or
specific details of requests for reveiw.64 Appointed by the Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, the FISC bench consists of eleven U.S. District Court Judges
and the government is the only party present during the FISC hearings. 65 The ex parte
sealed proceedings, held in secret, require a judicial ruling by the FISC on whether the
surveillance requests followed statutory protocols.66
Today, Japanese Americans, communists, civil rights groups, and radical
Christian organizations do not receive the same level of government attention or
monitoring as they once did. In part, this is because federal authorities perceive
another group to be the more immediate threat to national security. The threat they
once presented has been replaced by the newest perceived threat, acts of terrorism
committed by Muslim extremists.

62

Id.

63

Id. at 234.

64

Id. at 235.

65

Lance Davis, Note: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's May 17 Opinion: Maintaining a
Reasonable Balance Between National Security and Privacy Interests, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 713, 716
(2003).
66

Id.
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The extreme acts of violence in the early nineties and on 9/11 have changed
many things, including surveillance under FISA.67 Judging by the actions of the United
States government, attacks on American soil are treated very differently than American
conflicts abroad. Americans before 9/11 felt largely invincible and separated from
modern style terrorism occurring abroad. The Muslim terrorist attacks in the past twenty
years are the only massive assaults on American soil since the Japanese attacked
Pearl Harbor in the 1940’s.68 The profiling occurring today because of the attacks on
9/11 is similar in nature as to the profiling that occurred after Pearl Harbor over sixty five
years ago.69
Shortly after the 9/11 tragedies, Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act of 2001 (PATRIOT Act).70 The PATRIOT Act’s passage included as a purpose its
ability to circumvent an abundance of previously present red tape in the attainment of
warrants and government monitoring of citizens.71 The PATRIOT Act significantly

67

See generally Steven W. Becker, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . .": Assessing the Aftermath of
th
September 11 , 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 563 (2003).
68

Victoria S. Shabo, The 9/11 Commission and Implications for Legislative-Executive Information
Sharing, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (2005).
69

Lininger, supra note 1 at 1210-27.

70

Christina C. Logan, Liberty or Safety: Implications of the USA Patriot Act and the U.K.’s Anti-Terror
Lawson Freedom of Expression and Free Exercise of Religion, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 863, 867 (2007).
71

Robert C. Power, "Intelligence" Searches and Purpose: A Significant Mismatch between Constitutional
Criminal Procedure and the Law of Intelligence-Gathering, 30 PACE L. REV. 620, 634 (2010).
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changed the scope of FISA surveillance.72 The actual purpose of a FISA request for
surveillance before the PATRIOT act had to be for gathering foreign intelligence.73 Now
with the PATRIOT Act, gathering foreign intelligence only has to be a significant
purpose in order for FISC approval.74 This allows for what some believe political
incentives for surveillance on individuals and organizations.75 One significant change to
FISA because of the PATRIOT Act is the approval time for searches.76 The time frame
for physical searches now is ninety days.77 This should be compared to the four or five
days allowed for the searches before the PATRIOT Act.78
The PATRIOT Act significantly affected the way federal authorities implement
FISA. Previously, the FISC conducted a full review of a FISA order, including whether
the individual or group posed a “purpose” for surveillance as to foreign intelligence.79
Following 9/11, FISC’s responsibility, in reality, is limited to deciding whether the order

72

Patricia L. Bellia, Brave New World: U.S. Responses to the Rise in International Crime: The “Lone
Wolf” Amendment and the Future of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 50 VILL. L. REV. 425, 448
(2005).
73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id. at 443

77

Id.

78

Id.

79

John E. Branch III, Statutory Misinterpretation: The Foreign Intelligence Court of Review's Interpretation
of the "Significant Purpose" Requirement of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 81 N.C. L. REV.
2075, 2076 (2003).
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follows a general procedural test.80 The FISC no longer has any say in the target of
surveillance.81 The reasoning behind this is due to the Executive Branch’s interest in
wanting to protect possible intelligence information and limit the amount of people who
actually would have access to information on national security threats. 82 The Judicial
Branch gives deference to the Executive Branch’s experience in matters of national
security, but there is not yet confirmation that this deference is the best course. 83
In 2002, Congress replaced the reasonable suspicion requirement of FISA for
investigations of religious groups in favor of a less stringent standard, making it easier
for the government to obtain FISA orders.84 The only justification for a FISA order now
is that the information sought is related to the professed law enforcement purpose.85 A
possible justification for this change is the increased concern that Islamic groups
continue to plot and plan further aggressions against the United States. By removing
FISA’s reasonable suspicion requirement, the federal authorities suggest they are better
able to protect Muslim Americans, particularly from hate crimes in the post 9/11 era. 86
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The government’s ability to better protect Muslims from hate crimes may be true, but it
is not justifiable for the mass amount of people whose privacy rights were impeded on. 87
FISC’s reduced discretion coupled with the high approval rate of FISA orders
leads to a conclusion that Muslims have become primary targets of abuse under FISA.88
Islamic terrorism is a formidable adversary of the United States, but FISA’s current
guidelines may allow for mistakes and unjust investigation.89 Brandon Mayfield, an
American who converted to the Muslim faith, provides at least one example of an
innocent target harmed by broadening FISA’s application.
On March 11, 2004, a coordinated series of bombs erupted in Madrid on several
commuter trains.90 After the dust settled, 200 passengers had been killed and more
than 1,800 people were injured by the Spanish attacks that morning.91 Oregon attorney
Brandon Mayfield became a suspect of those terrorist bombings in Spain.92 In Mayfield
v. United States,93 the Department of Justice used FISA to gain intelligence and
surveillance privileges on Mayfield, who had strong ties to the Muslim community,
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through his faith, his family and his pro bono legal work. 94 The government accused
him of being involved in the Spanish bombings because of fingerprint information.95
The preliminary fingerprint analysis of a print found at the bomb site conducted by FBI
agents at Langley initially found no confirmed matches.96 Unsatisfied with the results,
the agents received orders to prepare a list of individuals who matched any points on
the fingerprint analyses.97 Once the list was compiled, the agents further narrowed the
list to the twenty most probable matches.98 Mr. Mayfield was number seventeen on the
list.99 The Spanish government received the FBI report results confirming that Brandon
Mayfield was the perpetrator, but the Spanish authorities discredited the FBI’s results
because they believed the two prints were too dissimilar.100 The United States
government continued to pursue Mayfield as the primary subject even after the Spanish
government had identified and arrested the actual terrorists.101 The manner in which
the United States government continued Mayfield’s prosecution suggests to the
researcher that the government’s interest may have been something other than finding
true justice.
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In the case against Brandon Mayfield, the government obtained a FISA order for
physical searches and electronic surveillance. The FBI’s reasoning to the FISC for the
FISA surveillance order was to “collect foreign intelligence information.”102 The FBI
followed Brandon and his family members when they traveled to and from a mosque,
Mr. Mayfield’s law office, the children’s schools and during other family activities. After
it finally became clear that Mr. Mayfield was not the culprit behind the Spanish terrorist
attacks, Mr. Mayfield filed suit against the government.103 Brandon Mayfield and the
government settled on the terms “that the government would pay compensatory
damages of $ 2 million to Mayfield and his family; destroy documents relating to the
electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to FISA; return seized materials to Mayfield;
and apologize to Mayfield and his family.”104 Mr. Mayfield also agreed not to seek any
further litigation with one exception being the constitutionality of FISA.105 Brandon
Mayfield then filed “suit seeking declaratory judgment that 50 U.S.C.S. §§ 1804 and
1823, provisions of FISA as amended by the PATRIOT Act, were unconstitutional under
the Fourth Amendment.”106 The United States District Court for the District of Oregon
agreed and granted the plaintiff’s relief making this one of the first times the
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constitutionality of FISA had been successfully challenged.107 The victory did not last
long though. The United States quickly appealed and the decision was vacated and
remanded with directions to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim.108
The first instances of profiling on the Islamic community appear shortly after the
first attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) in the early nineties.109 The government
told local FBI stations to start “mosque counting.”110 This process required agents to
literally count in their districts the number of mosques hosting regular congregations.111
Surveillance escalated to the government recording Muslim religious services and the
private discussions of Muslim worshipers attending the services.112 The FBI even
infiltrated some of the mosques with the use of undercover agents, surveillance
cameras, flyovers, and subpoenas for telephone calls of congregation members.113
The surveillance and “mosque counting” process enjoyed some success. While
recording conversations of members at a New York mosque, the FBI intercepted
information about future targets for terrorist attacks.114 Those recorded also discussed
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the success of their last attack, which was the World Trade Center.115 The surveillance
techniques led to successful acquisition and prosecution of the original WTC
terrorists.116 The prosecution of the WTC attackers is one example of the type of
government intrusion that gives credence to the great debate- whether the
government’s ignoring Fourth Amendment privacy rights is necessary to prevent further
attacks on American Citizens.117
The standards for obtaining permission to conduct surveillance under FISA are
lower than surveillance requests for ordinary, non-terror suspects.118 The FBI, however,
may be operating with more restrictive internal controls than statutorily required to
ensure better justification and more conscionable FISA privacy invasions. If some FBI
agencies feel the statutory regulations are not strict enough and impose a higher
internal standard then the legislation should keep up with those in the field and make
those standards mandatory across the board. Amendments to FISA and the limiting of
the FISC’s review process to a less strict general procedural check leaves ample room
for an order with insufficient basis to be approved and infringement on an innocent
citizen’s rights to be guaranteed.119
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The United States Treasury Department keeps a list of persons who have their
assets frozen.120 The Treasury Department’s list for suspected terrorists who have had
their assets frozen is known as the Specially Designated Global Terrorists list
(SDGT).121 By April 2005, the SDGT list had grown to 743 people and 947
organizations under allegations of material support to terrorism involving the use of
secret evidence. 122 Ninety percent of the individuals and ninety six percent of the
organizations on the SDGT list were Arabic or Islamic.123
The threat for further terrorist attacks is of serious concern in the United States,
but the stigma that the Muslim community will be the ones responsible has been
overstated.124 The government’s investigations and stereotyping of the Islamic
community has a larger effect than just the persons under investigation.125 Common
profiling and stereotyping by Americans has increased out of response to the
governmental investigations targeting only potential threats from the Muslim
community.126 The common profiling of the Islamic community by every day citizens is
a child-like reaction to what the greater power (the United States government) is most
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concerned with. This is in a sense how a child mimics their parents because the child
instinctively trusts and believes their parents to have better judgment on the matter.
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Chapter 3. Methodology
The researcher examined whether Muslim organizations and individuals are
targets of federal secret surveillance under FISA. In determining this, the researcher
employed both quantitative and qualitative research methods.
The quantitative component of the project consisted of a content analysis of
federal case law involving evidence gained through FISA surveillance. The researcher
was particularly interested in assessing the role FISA played in the cases, with special
interest in federal prosecutions and the influence FISA evidence may have had on
defendants. The researcher collected data and analyzed the information to examine
correlations of Islamic ties and the use of FISA as a means of gathering intelligence.
Statistical software allowed the researcher to gain empirical insight into the prosecutions
involving members of the American-Islamic community. The researcher’s target
population includes all of the reported cases of federal prosecutions involving FISA and
issued from 1978 to 2010.
The idea for the thesis topic is the result of researcher’s experiences gained
while working with a professor during a directed study project. The directed study
project encompassed conducting legal research involving FISA. Throughout the study,
the researcher began to notice the majority of the prosecutions involved persons of the
Islamic faith. After further research, it seemed apparent that a strong connection
existed between the use of FISA evidence in federal prosecutions after 9/11 and the
indictments of Muslim defendants, Islamic organizations, and businesses associated
with or having ties to individuals of the Muslim faith. The strongest evidence of this
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connection has arisen in the past decade. Initially, injustices were not readily apparent,
in part because of the blinding influence of the 9/11 attacks by Muslim extremists. As
the subject was considered further, potential injustices became more difficult to
rationalize.
To begin, the researcher conducted a content analysis of all the federal trial court
and appellate court cases involving FISA to collect information since its enactment.
Upon initial review of the literature, a concern surfaced. After 9/11, many cases relying
on FISA evidence had connections to the Muslim community. The researcher became
interested in the possibility that profiling by government authorities continues in the
United States today. This led to an interest in determining whether the connection
between the Islamic community and FISA persisted throughout the case law. The
researcher then identified all of the federal trial court and appellate court cases involving
FISA by using key search terms through Westlaw. The electronic data base allows
searches to be conducted using key words. The most complete list of cases resulted
from the search terms “FISA & Surveillance.” The resulting list of federal trial court and
appellate court cases identified 180 opinions relevant to this study. Using the issuing
court and the date, the researcher created a master list dividing the cases by date and
by issuing court.
The researcher began the content analysis by determining a list of variables that
would be identified in each of the opinions. A spreadsheet was then created in
Microsoft Excel to allow the researcher to input information from each of the cases
related to the variables. Additionally, the list of 180 opinions was reduced to 112 that
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met the study parameters – opinions in which FISA evidence was relevant to the case
outcome.
The first variable for the table was the case name and citation so the opinion
could be easily identified and located. After entering each opinion’s case name and
reference citation, the researcher began inputting data relevant to the next variables,
beginning with the court (“Court”) that issued the opinion. The variable was selected
because it would allow the user to be able to identify the jurisdiction and the
geographical area the opinions relying on FISA were issued. The opinions are ordered
from the most recent to the oldest. Further, the opinions are listed beginning with the
appellate decision, issuing from the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal, and then the
trial court decisions, the United States District Courts. The third variable selected for
study, delineated as “Issue before the Court,” was chosen to examine whether FISA
impacts the outcome of the federal prosecutions.
The next the variable is “Muslim Ties.” This variable includes whether a
defendant or plaintiff is of the Muslim faith and whether the parties had dealings with
Muslim organizations or businesses. The researcher includes two separate variables
referencing the dates of the opinions. The first of the two is simply the date the
published opinion issued from the court. The second date variable records information
about whether the issued date of the opinion fell before or after 9/11/01. This variable
was initially believed to be significant because of the amendments to FISA that resulted
from the enactment of the PATRIOT Act. This construct is included to determine what
impact, if any, 9/11 had on the government’s use of FISA in relevant cases. Equally
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important is determining whether the cases whose opinions issued after 9/11 had a
higher frequency of non-government parties with, “Muslim Ties.” The cursory review of
the FISA opinions allowed the researcher to readily identify, without the aid of data entry
or statistical analysis, that there had been a substantial increase in the number of
Muslims connected to cases involving FISA after 9/11.
It was necessary to discern the type of case, criminal or civil; therefore, type of
case was included for analysis. Variables eight (criminal charges) and nine
(convictions) were identified by the researcher after reading and analyzing law review
articles written about FISA. The articles raised an interesting point that though FISA is
used to gather intelligence on individuals thought to be agents aiding foreign powers in
enterprises related to terror, most of the criminal prosecutions involve charges for
common crimes not related to terrorism. This data offers assistance in determining
what types of charging crimes were brought by federal prosecutors using FISA evidence
and what convictions, if any, resulted from the prosecution. The researcher theorized
data associated with this variable would be instructive concerning the pervasiveness, or
lack thereof, of the prosecution of terror-related crimes. Conversely then, the next two
variables addressed civil claims and civil verdicts. These two variables would allow the
researcher to analyze the types of damages plaintiffs were seeking in civil suits. The
researcher hypothesized that analysis of the civil variables would demonstrate a
majority of the claims are to recover after criminal prosecutions in which FISA was used.
These cases seemed to involve the return of documents, materials and effects taken
during secret FISA sneak-and-peaks or the request for damages related to the
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government’s surveillance. Variable eleven, civil verdicts, presents an opportunity to
discover empirically how the courts interpreted these claims and the level of success
citizens would had be targets of surveillance had recovering monetary damages for
surveillance.
There is also a variable that addresses whether the named party or parties of
interest are an individual, more than one individual or a formal group/entity (business or
organization). During the researcher’s directed study and reading through FISA law
reviews, a potential pattern arose involving defendants who were of the Muslim faith or
being or had dealings with Muslim-based organizations. Curious about this relationship,
the researcher included a variable that would allow further investigation.
The final variable to be considered in the content analysis is whether there is an
Al Qaeda connection. Al Qaeda admitted to its role as the mastermind behind the terror
attacks of 9/11, and the researcher was interested in examining what relationship the
Muslims identified in the study have with this terrorist organization.
After entering data from the cases, the researcher needed to conduct statistical
analysis of the data contained in the spreadsheet, but before the information could be
analyzed, the data needed to be numerically coded. To accomplish this, the researcher
assigned each variable item a numerical value. These values were coded consistent
with the codebook or key that was prepared in association with the spreadsheet and the
data it contained. Each numeral correlates to information related to the variable. For
example; Variable D is “Muslim Connection” so if there is a Muslim connection the
information gets the assigned value of (1), if there is no connection then the value is
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assigned (0). Most of the variables are far more complicated than a simple
dichotomous variable (yes or no) and have many different values beyond zero and one.
The values for each variable are saved in what is known as the “Codebook”. The
codebook is included as an attachment in (Appendix A) for a complete breakdown of
each piece of information within each variable.
Once the codesheet and codebook were completed, the researcher was able to
run central tendencies (frequencies and averages) on the data to determine basic
descriptive information about the data. The results from each variable were compared
between the constraints looking for information relevant to the study’s research
questions. This concluded the quantitative research aspect of the empirical legal
studies approach.
The qualitative review included a study of current federal criminal prosecutions
involving FISA surveillance. The review started with attempting to learn more about
FISA and investigate whether anyone else found profiling to be a continuing issue in the
post 9/11 era. While ample literature is available about the profiling of Muslims and the
use of FISA, little has been written on FISA surveillance of Muslim Americans as a tool
in the government’s arsenal and a vehicle for the profiling of these citizens. Examining
the changes to surveillance law and amendments was a justifiable alternative for
information about current profiling occurring in the United States today. The thesis
research required a survey of the existing literature addressing profiling and the history
of surveillance law in the United States. The qualitative research includes an additional
examination of the published opinions in federal prosecutions from 1978 to 2010. It also
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includes a review of the published opinions in civil cases for the same period.
Additionally, the researcher conducted more traditional legal research using Westlaw
and Lexis-Nexis Academic to further identify any possible impact the use of FISA has
had on the Islamic community. The researcher utilized Lexis-Nexis Academic to
originally educate himself about FISA and the changes to it since its creation. Using
Lexis-Nexis, the researcher was able to narrow his searches to results of less than 100
to get the most relevant law review articles. As previously noted, the searches started
in an attempt to understand the basic concepts of FISA, but quickly one idea began to
build on another.
The researcher decided to explore the history of profiling and stereotyping not
related to surveillance to better understand the capabilities of the United States
government and its citizens. A review of law review articles on FISA and the
implications to the Islamic community since 9/11 presented some common themes in
the research literature. These themes focused on the changes to FISA and the
implications those changes have had on the way surveillance is conducted in the United
States. Another common idea in the qualitative research emerged from the theoretical
reviews. The reviews demonstrated how the government has made the same mistakes
of privacy invasion in the past, but somehow gets caught up in itself and occurs again
and again. These theoretical articles also contained another avenue of study for the
researcher. Specifically a third theme focused on how the United States reacts to
attacks on American soil as compared to conflict abroad.
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The researcher was able to use empirical legal studies to employ a mixed
methods approach that consisted of a quantitative and a qualitative component.
Utilizing both types of research approaches throughout the directed readings and thesis
semesters allowed the student to differentiate the research and allow concepts and
ideas to build and fuel each other into what you see as the complete research product.
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Chapter 4. Results
This study employs a mixed methods approach combining quantitative analysis
with a qualitative component reached through a form of legal research. Below the
results are reported for each approach.

Quantitative Results

The results of the quantitative research were reached by utilizing the statistical
software package, Stata, to determine descriptive information for the relevant variables.
The following summarizes the results of statistical analysis based on the research
questions formed.
The FISA decisions reported since 1978 include both criminal and civil cases.
Though the study focuses solely on criminal cases, it is instructive to provide the reader
with a foundation of overall frequency of outcomes comparing civil to criminal cases.
The researcher theorized a majority of the published opinions would be criminal. The
results indicate that approximately 63 percent or seventy cases involving FISA were
criminal prosecutions. Conversely, the remaining 37 percent reported on civil disputes.
The researcher then analyzed the criminal charges of the seventy criminal cases
and a significant majority resulted. Originally the researcher thought a majority of the
criminal charges would be terror related. The most common crime charged in the
published federal prosecutions is conspiracy and conspiracy-related crimes, both of
which appeared twenty four times, and is significantly more than the next most
commonly charged crime of terrorism and terror-related crimes. Terror-related crimes
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appeared five times in the results. The frequency of conspiracy-related crimes is more
than four times that of terror-related crimes, the next most popular crime charged.
Conspiracy crimes make up 21.43 percent of the total number of opinions and 34.29
percent of the total criminal decisions.
The researcher then examined the outcome of the cases and theorized that a
majority would be affirmed convictions. The most frequent result of the variable is that
the appellate court affirmed the trial court convictions. Affirmed convictions have a
frequency of thirty-four or 30.36 percent of all the published opinions in the study.
Comparing the total amount of affirmed convictions to the seventy criminal
prosecutions, the percentage increases to 48.57. This data can then be contrasted to
the number of cases with reversed judgments and vacated judgments. Variables,
reversed judgments and vacated judgments, each appeared once in the study and each
had a corresponding percentage of 0.89 in the total opinions.
The next variable examined is whether the federal opinion was published before
9/11. The total number of published federal opinions studied is 112 and the researcher
predicted that the majority of the opinions would appear after 9/11. The resulting
frequency of published opinions before 9/11 is forty. Thus, the frequency of opinions
published after 9/11 is seventy two. The variable was designed to allow the researcher
to measure the impact of 9/11 on court opinions in which FISA evidence played a role.
The results indicate that the first twenty three years of FISA’s existence accounts for
only 35.40 percent of the published federal opinions involving FISA. Interestingly, the
remaining published opinions involving FISA were issued in the last nine years of
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FISA’s existence. In the years following 9/11, a period of time that accounts for 28
percent of FISA’s lifespan, 72 percent of published opinions involving FISA appeared.
The vast majority of FISA opinions, therefore, arose after 9/11.
Another point of interest involves which jurisdiction and which courts hosted FISA
cases. The “courts” variable was included to determine the frequency of FISA cases
within the reporting jurisdictions or courts. The researcher hypothesized there would be
no significant majority in this variable. The results indicate; however, that a few
jurisdictions have reported more FISA opinions than their sister courts. Of the published
federal opinions since FISA’s enactment in 1978, a few courts resulted in a higher
frequency than others in respect to the “courts” variable. The U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court appears most frequently amongst the 112 cases,
with thirteen opinions or 11.61 percent of all of the federal decisions. Of the trial courts
that heard FISA cases, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
appears most frequently with twelve opinions or nearly 11 percent of the total number of
published FISA decisions. It is, perhaps, noteworthy to mention that the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia also appeared frequently with nine decisions
emanating from it, a total that represents 8 percent of the total decisions. The findings
reveal that out of the total 112 opinions examined, 30.36 percent were heard by only
three jurisdictions.
Further review of the FISA opinions indicate that twenty-two different FISArelated procedural benchmarks were presented to the courts for determination. Of the
twenty-two processes, three stood out in frequency over the others. As might be
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expected, appeals appeared most frequently. In fact, appeals represented nearly 35
percent of the procedural actions recorded. The next highest result is held by
dispositive motions in the district courts, otherwise known as motions to dismiss.
Motions to dismiss appeared seventeen times across all opinions in the study and
resulted in 15.18 percent of all procedural benchmarks filed. Lastly, motions to
suppress appeared fifteen times or 13.39 percent of the published opinions. The
frequency of the top three issues heard before the court comprises 63.39 percent of all
procedural processes in the published federal opinions since the enactment of FISA.
The results of the next variable inform the researcher what type of defendant was
named in the government’s prosecutions. The researcher theorized that there would be
fewer individuals and more groups involved in the opinions. Individuals, indicated
alone, comprised 55.36 percent or sixty-two of the published opinions. Entities
(organizations, religious groups, corporations, and businesses) appeared twenty seven
times or 24.11 percent of the opinions studied. Multiple individuals or groups of
individuals, indicated together, reported a frequency of twenty-three or 20.54 percent of
the opinions. Thus, individuals indicted alone occupy the most frequently appearing
classification of defendants named in federal prosecutions in which FISA evidence is
used.

Muslim Connection Results

The first variable to be analyzed that relates to the Islamic community is whether
the parties had a Muslim connection. The dichotomous constraint indentifies whether
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there is a connection to the Islamic community. The researcher hypothesized a majority
of the opinions would contain a connection to the Muslim community. The results
indicated that forty-six of the 112 cases had a Muslim connection in the opinion and
sixty-three cases did not. Three cases had a religious affiliation other than Muslim.
Overall, the results indicated that since the enactment of FISA, 41.07 percent of the
published federal opinions contained an Islamic connection. As expected, when the
variables are combined the results indicate a majority of the cases involving Muslim
connections were published after 9/11. More particularly, the results show that fortyone of the forty-six opinions with an Islamic tie occurred after 9/11. As previously
demonstrated, seventy two of the 112 cases appear after the terrorist attacks on 9/11.
Thus, 56.94 percent of the published federal opinions after 9/11 relate to the Islamic
community. The number of opinions with a Muslim connection before 9/11 is five or
12.50 percent. The last result acquired from this cross tabulation of the two variables is
the “other religious affiliations.” All three of the opinions with a religious tie other than
Islamic appear before 9/11 and none other than Islamic appear after 9/11. The
researcher than ran frequency analyses on the number of instances Al Qaeda appeared
in the opinions. Of the opinions reported, eighteen had a connection to Al Qaeda, or
16.07 percent of all FISA related published opinions. To fully understand this result, the
researcher then conducted cross tabulations for the number of Muslim connections and
Al Qaeda appearances. Of the forty-six total Muslim connections, seventeen of them
also were related to Al Qaeda. In addition to this result, all of the seventeen Al
Qaeda/Muslim connections appeared after 9/11.
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To further determine the types of Muslim connections in the published opinions,
the researcher tabulated the frequency of the types of Muslim defendants. The
researcher originally hypothesized that lone individuals would make up the majority of
Islamic connections. The results concluded that out of the forty-six Muslim connections,
twenty-two were lone individuals or 47.83 percent. Entities such as businesses,
religious organizations, or other groups appeared fifteen times in the results or 32.61
percent of the defendants with Muslim ties and the other nine Islamic connections were
groups of individuals for 19.57 percent of the published opinions. In addition to the
types of defendants with a Muslim connection, the researcher also gathered results of
another cross tabulation of two variables, “Muslim connections” and “civil v. criminal.”
The results indicated that of the opinions with an Islamic connection, twenty-six of them
were criminal and nineteen were civil. Thus, the results demonstrate a higher chance,
56.52 percent, for a Muslim connection to appear in a criminal prosecution rather than in
civil litigation.
The final question considered the frequency of terror-related criminal charges
associated with prosecutions involving a Muslim connection. The researcher theorized
a majority of the criminal charges in opinions containing a Islamic connection would be
terror-related. Of the forty-six published opinions with a Muslim connection, twenty-six
were criminal prosecutions. Terror-related crimes evidenced a frequency of five or 4.46
percent of the total charges. The researcher than had to determine how many of the
five terror-related crimes charged had a Muslim connection. Of the five, four had an
Islamic connection and one was connected to the IRA. Thus, four terror related crimes
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were charged in twenty -six criminal prosecutions containing a Muslim tie or 15.38
percent of the published opinions studied.
According to the results of the study, an individual charged in a case in which
FISA was used has a 63.72 percent chance of being involved in a case after 9/11.
Next, the party has a sixty three percent chance of being a defendant in a criminal
prosecution in which FISA evidence was utilized. After 9/11, the defendant would have
a 56.94 percent chance of being Muslim or being in association with the Islamic
community. The defendant would most probably be a lone individual charged, 55.36
percent of the time, and the most probable type of crime the defendant would be
charged with would be conspiracy related. Lastly, the defendant would most likely be
appealing the conviction in the United States Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit and
more likely than not the defendant’s conviction of a conspiracy related crime would be
affirmed.
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Chapter 5. Conclusion
This thesis project began a journey for the researcher during which he hoped to
determine whether after September 11, 2001, the Islamic community provides a target
for government profiling aided in its profiling by the use of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA). The original hypothesis theorized that the terrorist attacks of
9/11 resulted in amendments to FISA that now serve as a medium for the profiling of the
Islamic community. A mixed-methods research approach consisting of quantitative and
qualitative research confirmed the researcher’s hypothesis that the Islamic community is
being profiled by the use of FISA after 9/11. The researcher arrived at this conclusion
by conducting quantitative research involving a content analysis of federal case law
involving evidence gained through FISA surveillance. The researcher also employed
qualitative research using a form of legal research that required him to identify and
analyze law reviews pertaining to profiling, statutory enactments, including FISA and the
USA PATRIOT Act, and case law reported court decisions that involved FISA. The
combination of research methods resulted in the confirmation of the theory that the
government’s use of FISA has enabled its profiling of the Islamic community.
Al Qaeda admitted its responsibility for the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the study
shows that the use of FISA is significantly increased after the attacks. The radical and
violent group is a Muslim based organization and the research shows the implications of
the group attacking on 9/11 has given rise to profiling of the Muslim community as a
whole by the use of FISA after the attacks. Nearly two-thirds of the FISA opinions have
been issued in the decade since 9/11, as opposed to the remaining one-third delivered
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between 1978 and 2001. This is largely due to a significant increase in the use of FISA
surveillance since 9/11 resulting from the amendments to FISA in the PATRIOT Act.
To initially determine whether the United States government was profiling the
Muslim society today, the researcher examined the history of profiling and stereotyping
throughout the history of surveillance law. The process revealed a consistent pattern of
government profiling aided by the use of surveillance techniques. Beginning as early as
the bootleggers in the 1920’s, the government evidenced a propensity for both profiling
and using surveillance to monitor targeted members of the profiled segment of the
population. The landmark case of Olmstead v. United States was the first time the
United States Supreme Court sanctioned the use of electronic surveillance and
authorized government monitoring of a particular group that was then the subject of
profiling. Profiling by the government has continued since. Including the previously
mentioned bootleggers from the 1920’s, six major groups have served as known
government profiling targets (as well as targets for government surveillance): the
Japanese in the 1940’s, alleged communists Americans in the 1950’s and 1960’s, civil
rights movement members in the 1960’s and 1970’s, radical Christian groups in the
1980’s, and Muslims since the first World Trade Center attacks in the 1990’s. Common
to each is the observation that after an attack or large scale change occurring on
American soil, the government’s interest in these groups is intensified resulting in
heightened surveillance.
After 9/11, the government argued that the restrictions of many regulations,
including FISA, were too stringent and curtailed its ability to provide adequate national
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security. The government assured the American people the PATRIOT Act would
increase the government’s effectiveness, and, at least as the legislation concerned
FISA, allow the necessary surveillance to protect the American people. As this study
reveals, the use of FISA surveillance and evidence collection increased significantly and
became a favored “weapon” in the government’s arsenal against the Muslim enemy of
the United States.
To fully understand the extent of the profiling occurring against the Islamic
community much further research is needed. Using the researcher’s content analysis
as a starting point, research could be continued to include the civil litigation in which
FISA surveillance and evidence was utilized. Examining the civil aspects of FISA would
allow a researcher to determine whether the government’s surveillance and evidence
collection through FISA has been sanctioned in the civil system. The study revealed
that defendants in criminal prosecutions enjoyed very little success against in criminal
court, and it would be interesting to see how courts decide civil matters for return of
documents and retributions for improper surveillance.
The American people should be aware of the profiling occurring against Muslim
Americans today. The study depicts that throughout the history of United States
surveillance, a significant number of groups and religions have been impacted. The
problem goes far beyond that of one particular group. The government has proven itself
incapable of ethically conducting surveillance on its own people without proper
regulation or restrictions in place. There is a reason to look beyond the attacks of 9/11
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and examine government profiling, not only of the Islamic community, but beyond these
groups because there are considerable implications for other groups of citizens.
The researcher concludes that the only way to prevent further profiling of
Muslims enabled by the use of FISA is to restore the statute to its original language as
enacted in 1978. Giving the FISC the power to once again conduct a full review of FISA
orders and determine the potential of a threat to national security is the only way to
keep the government’s use of FISA in check. In every other aspect of the law, a citizen
has the right for a judge to fully review the evidence and determine if the government
has shown adequate cause before action is taken against them. The researcher
suggests to prevent further profiling the language of FISA be amended to its original
mandate. As it is written, due to the PATRIOT Act, only a “significant purpose” of a
FISA order must be for gathering foreign intelligence information. In the researcher’s
opinion, if there are reasons for a FISA order other than for gathering intelligence
information, then there are alternative avenues for surveillance and investigations
beyond FISA.
The researcher anticipates continuing his research on both FISA and its use as a
tool to facilitate targeting Muslims, particularly American Muslims. It is important to
increase awareness of the prevalence of Muslim profiling by American authorities. One
avenue available to the researcher is to more broadly distribute his research findings.
This can be accomplished in a number of ways, including the publication of his research
and the presentation of his study’s results in both academic and lay settings.
Additionally, further research is warranted and might include conducting broader

46

qualitative studies that will consist of interviews with Muslims in general, but more
particularly with American Muslims directly affected by FISA surveillance and profiling.
Acquiring direct experiences from FISA and profiling victims would enhance the
preliminary research accomplished through this thesis project. Further research
inquiries should also include interviews of federal authorities, such as FBI agents,
former FBI agents, Department of Justice employees, congressional representatives,
congressional staff personnel, and other to learn more about the use of FISA, agencies’
internal controls, circumvention of surveillance restrictions, and other research interests
that may arise.
The research could also be furthered to better understand why the Islamic
community became a profiling target. The researcher would like to examine the extent
of radical Muslim sects. Studying the United States reaction to modern terrorism from
Islamic groups like Al Qaeda and the Taliban may hold clues to how the profiling of all
Muslims came to be. The researcher would like to compare and contrast American
gangs to violent Muslim sects to try to understand how the government gauges foreign
threats differently than domestic ones.
Due to the narrow scope and time frame of the undergraduate thesis process,
the research had some limitations. The researcher was unable to interview anyone
impacted or profiled by FISA. Similarly, law enforcement authorities who work with
FISA on a routine basis were unwilling to provide inclusion in the project. In addition, for
this project the researcher limited the scope of research to include only criminal
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prosecutions. Further analyses that consider the civil implications of FISA are also
needed.
The nation’s founding fathers established a federal government whose purpose
is largely to provide protection to its citizens and to protect the rights of those citizens as
outlined in the Constitution, but it seems the two tasks conflict with each other and
collide within the context of governmental surveillance. Citizens of the Untied States
have an inherent trust in their leaders, and if the government demonstrates a pattern of
profiling the Islamic community through surveillance laws, citizens will follow suit. This
thought process has implications beyond the profiling and stereotyping of the Islamic
people by the government as society has seen other instances in airports and local
businesses of non-Muslim citizens profiling Muslims in the wake of 9/11. Some
Americans feel as if members of the Muslim community are more likely to attempt to
hurt them and their families and Muslim Americans are aware of these connotations. If
a change is not made at the executive and legislative levels, perhaps beginning with
revisiting more stringent FISA restrictions, then the tensions between the United States
and the national Islamic community will only escalate. “Privacy is a basic right,
protected by the laws and Constitution of the United States. While national security is an
immensely important interest, the government should not sacrifice all else while trying to
protect it.”127

127

Forgang, supra note 3, at 266.
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APPENDIX A: Code Book
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CODE BOOK
A) Case ID #
- Numbers 1-112 correspond to individual cases involving FISA. The cases are
listed in reverse chronological order by court starting with the U.S.C.A. Each
case has exactly one entry ID #. Thus, there are 112 cases in the study.
B) Courts
- U.S.C.A.:
o 1st Cir. = (1)
o 2nd Cir. = (2)
o 4th Cir. = (4)
o 6th Cir. = (6)
o 7th Cir. = (7)
o 8th Cir. = (8)
o 9th Cir. = (9)
o 10th Cir. = (10)
o 11th Cir. = (11)
o Fed. Cir. = (13)
o District of Columbia = (15)
- U.S.D.C.:
o IDs are a group of 3 numbers:
 First number will be the US district Court number 1-11
 Second number will be the section in each state
 District = (0)
 North = (1)
 Central = (2)
 Middle= (3)
 South = (4)
 East = (5)
 West = (6)
 The last number will be the assigned State number listed below
 Example: U.S.D.C. D. Massachusetts: District 1, District section
0, State ID 1 (101)
o Districts and States
 1st District
 MA (1)
50

2nd District
 NY (1)
 CT (2)
rd
 3 District
 PA (1)
th
 4 District
 MD (1)
 VA (2)
 NC (3)
th
 5 District
 TX (1)
th
 6 District
 OH (1)
 MI (2)
th
 7 District
 WI (1)
 IL (2)
th
 8 District
 MN (1)
 MO (2)
th
 9 District
 CA (1)
 OR (2)
 HI (3)
th
 10 District
 KS (1)
th
 11 District
 GA (1)
 FL (2)
o The court section within each state is labeled as following:
 District = (0)
 North = (1)
 Central = (2)
 Middle= (3)
 South = (4)
 East = (5)
 West = (6)
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C)

D)

E)
F)

o District of Columbia = (16)
- U.S. Court of Fed. Claims = (12)
- U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Court = (14)
Issue Before Court
(1) Declaratory Judgment
(2) Subpoena Appeal
(3) Appeal of the Trial Court’s decision
(4) Motion to Dismiss
(5) Change of Venue
(6) Motion to Suppress
(7) Trial
(8) Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss
(9) Motion for Summary Judgment
(10)
Discovery and Evidentiary Rulings
(11)
M/PO
(12)
M/D, M/S
(13)
Motion for New Trial
(14)
Motion for Declaratory Judgment
(15)
Evidentiary Hearing
(16)
Preliminary Injunction for return of Seized Property
(17)
Motion to Amend
(18)
Motion for Disclosure
(19)
Motion for Pretrial Discovery
(20)
Request for Information
(21)
Motion to Disclose
(22)
Motion to Compel
Muslim Con.
(0) No Connection
(1) Muslim Connection
(2) IRA Connection
(3) Mormon Connection
Date
a. The opinion date for each of the 112 cases.
< or > 9/11/01
a. The following demonstrates whether or not the opinion issued was before
or after 9/11/01
(0) Opinion issued before 9/11/01
(1) Opinion issued after 9/11/01
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G) Civ or Crim
(1) Criminal Case
(2) Civil Case
H) Crim Charges (Criminal Charges)
(0) N/A
(1) Unknown
(2) Unauthorized Contact with Fed. Prisioner
(3) Evidence obtained should be suppressed
(4) Terrorism
(5) Conspiracy
(6) Export-control laws
(7) Acting as an agent to a foreign power
(8) Unlawfully obtaining citizenship
(9) Drugs
(10)
M/S evidence from the ECPA
(11)
M/Vacate
(12)
Counterfeiting
(13)
Loan sharking
(14)
Incidental surveillance evidence
(15)
Assault and battery
(16)
Tax matters
(17)
5th and 6th amendments
(18)
Discovery violations
(19)
Perjury
(20)
Legality of detention
(21)
Espionage
(22)
Directing structured bank transaction
(23)
Intercepted material by FISA
(24)
Contempt under FISA
(25)
Failure to report contacts with a citizen of communist
nation
(26)
Donations to organization in connection to terrorism
I) Crim Conv.
a. Criminal Convictions
(0) N/A
(1) Affirmed Convictions
(2) M/D and M/S denied
(3) Vacated and Remanded
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(4) Vacated and Granted M/S
(5) Dismissed
(6) Unknown
(7) Reversed
J) Civ Claims (Civil Claim)
(0) N/A
(1) Unknown
(2) FISA and Unconstitutional
(3) Appeal
(4) FOIA
(5) Damages from being victimized
(6) Torture Victim Protection Act
(7) Failure to state a claim
(8) Subject Matter Jurisdiction
(9) FISA compliance
(10)
M/SJ warrantless wiretapping
(11)
Wrongful death
(12)
(13)
Block pending investigation
(14)
Water rights
(15)
Conspiracy
(16)
Discrimination
(17)
Evidentiary motions
(18)
NSA letters
(19)
Unlawful arrest and imprisonment
(20)
Torts related to international and domestic law
(21)
Return of seized items
K) Civ. Verd. (Civil Verdict)
(0) N/A
(1) Unknown
(2) Dismissed
(3) Affirmed Judgment
(4) Reversed
(5) Vacated
(6) Remanded
(7) M/D granted
(8) M/SJ granted
(9) Inadmissible
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(10)
(11)

Enjoined from issuing NSA letters
Court Stayed

L) Def.
a. Type of Defendants
(1) Individual
(2) Group (organization, religious group, corporation, business)
(3) Individuals (Multiple individuals but not from a common group)
M) Al Qaeda
a. Al Qaeda Connection
(1) None
(2) Yes Al Qaeda Connection
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